After the Sept. 11 attack at the World Trade Center, an independent consultant studied the Fire Department’s performance and identified a number of lapses amid all the undeniable valor of that day. It said that too many men rushed into the buildings before anyone realized the danger they were in, contributing to the staggering death toll.
The consultant, McKinsey & Company, said the Fire Department needed to use more caution and preparation when it approached such a major, complicated fire, and not send too many men in before it knew what it was dealing with.
Saturday’s fire at the former Deutsche Bank building, which left two firemen dead, presented its own set of challenges, but it also bore similarities to Sept. 11 that went beyond geography, including the fact that the building was a high-rise.
Now, some are questioning Saturday’s response, noting that, at one point, more than 100 firefighters were inside the building even though the fire was out of control and wildly unpredictable — and that those men had to be called out. And they were inside even though, unlike the situation in the twin towers, no workers were trapped.
“Clearly firefighters were sent into a deathtrap,” said Stephen J. Cassidy, president of the Uniformed Firefighters Association. “I think the Fire Department’s position is they didn’t know how bad it was. We certainly need to find out why they didn’t know.”
Yesterday, Fire Commissioner Nicholas Scoppetta directed his investigators to determine why the department did not have a plan in place to fight a fire in the building.
Mr. Cassidy made his remarks as the Manhattan district attorney, Robert M. Morgenthau, announced that his office had opened an investigation into the fire to determine if any crimes had been committed. The move extends the prosecutors’ subpoena power to the fire marshals who are working with the district attorney’s office.
Mr. Cassidy also called for an independent investigation of the fire by the state attorney general, Andrew M. Cuomo, who said last night that his office had begun reviewing the circumstances of the fire. Mr. Cassidy said the department was “not capable” of doing its own investigation because of its own involvement and its relationship with other city agencies involved.
In a way, it is a debate that goes to the heart of Fire Department culture — rushing into burning buildings, after all, is what firefighters do. And for their part, fire officials said they believed that Saturday’s fire was well managed, and that the department’s response could not be compared to its actions on 9/11.
“This is a fire in a high-rise building; it is not a terrorist attack,” said Francis X. Gribbon, the department’s chief spokesman. “They see the fire, they know where the fire is. They use the protocols in place to fight the fire.”
Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg defended the department’s decision to send the more than 100 firefighters up into the building to fight the blaze, saying they bravely improvised in a crisis.
The Deutsche Bank building is being dismantled. Sheathed in black netting and plywood, the floors where the men were trapped had been sealed off with plywood and plastic sheeting, creating a maze that became especially daunting as the building filled with wind-fanned black smoke.
Radio transmissions captured the moment when high-ranking officials ordered all the men out — a striking echo of Sept. 11. With two men down and 29 Maydays coming from hellishly fire-engulfed floors, commanders wanted to do a head count.
The priorities of those in charge of the fire response are crystallized in one transmission: A senior official cursed as he said he did not care about the building, and shouted, “Where are my men?”
Firefighters were trapped without water because the standpipe system — plagued by a shut valve, cracks and a broken pipe — malfunctioned. The two firefighters who died, Robert Beddia, 53, and Joseph Graffagnino, 33, ran out of air. Investigators are focusing on a discarded cigarette or faulty electrical panel as the cause of the blaze.
“This was an unoccupied building,” said a former fire official. “On 9/11 we sent too many people in. McKinsey said that we should not rush men in and, even though the investigation is ongoing, it seems obvious at this point that we still have not learned the lesson that if you’re going to send people in, there should be adequate time and means to get them out.”
Charles R. Blaich, a retired deputy chief who was in charge of safety for the Fire Department at the ground zero site, said the McKinsey report changed how the department managed disasters.
“After 9/11 there were directions that came out from the chief of department that we never get ourselves into a position at these huge disasters where we just blindly assign assets without reasonably assessing what risks we face and what benefits we will achieve,” Mr. Blaich said. “What are we going to achieve by doing this?”
Thomas Von Essen, the fire commissioner on Sept. 11, said he had had many conversations with firefighters who responded on Saturday. He said many felt the operation had moved too quickly.
Mr. Von Essen said it was widely known that the bank building was undergoing a complex and dangerous demolition. He said fire officials should not have been surprised by what the firefighters encountered.
John J. McDonnell, the president of the Uniformed Fire Officers Association, said he believed the lessons of Sept. 11 had been learned “to some extent.”
“I don’t know if the upper echelons of the Fire Department were aware of the complex nature of the abatement within the building, I mean everyone from the fire commissioner to his staff,” said Mr. McDonnell, whose union represents 2,450 members.
“Were they aware of the complex nature?” he asked. “If they were aware prior to that, maybe there would have been a different fire plan in place.”
He added, “Under a hazardous materials condition, you approach things on a much more cautious level. ”
Firefighters at the scene checked in with commanders, said Mr. Gribbon, the department spokesman. “They were given assignments and they went to work.”
Mr. Gribbon declined to release a minute-by-minute breakdown of the department’s response because he said the department was conducing an internal review that involved listening to radio transmissions, transcribing the tapes, interviews and re-interviews, among other things.
Mr. McDonnell said no one had been prepared to find the stairwell landings blocked by the heavy plywood boards used to compartmentalize buildings where asbestos was being removed. Firefighters had to use an exterior elevator and scaffolding stairs to get up and down.
Jerome M. Hauer, director of the city’s Office of Emergency Management from 1996 to 2000, said it was “unfair” to contrast the department’s operations on Saturday with the findings of the McKinsey report because “I don’t feel that the report was accurate in some of its assessments.”
He said the accountability for what occurred “has to rest” with the building owner and the demolition operators, not with the Fire Department.
