Mine owner fined $1.5 million after probe of fatal fire
Everything that could be wrong...was. Passive protection was missing, systems didn't work, parts were incompatible, training inadequate, incorrect escape plan and no water.
A report by the Mine Safety and Health Administration chronicled safety shortcuts and flagrant violations of basic mining laws at the company's Aracoma Alma No. 1 mine just outside this southern West Virginia town. Two miners died at Aracoma Alma on Jan. 19, 2006, when they became lost amid dense smoke that poured into what was supposed to be a sealed escape route, after a conveyor belt caught fire.
"At Aracoma, it appears that deficiencies were not fully recognized by mine personnel or by state or federal inspectors," the company statement said.
The MSHA investigation found widespread and serious failures in the Aracoma Alma operation, including a nearly half-hour delay in ordering miners in the area to evacuate when the air monitoring system sounded.
It also described a chaotic scene in which workers had no water to fight the fire, incompatible firehose couplings and inaccurate mine maps with which to attempt a rescue.
The two miners, both roofbolt operators, were part of a 12-man crew working three miles into the mine when the fire started. As the crew tried to make its way out, it found the escape path filled with smoke due to a missing stopping, a panel that directs airflow underground.
"That stopping never existed. It existed only on paper, on some maps," said Bill Francart, a Pittsburgh-based mining engineer who was part of the investigative team.
